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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
after eight years of unavailing inquiries as to the ownership of the donkey, he sold it
for junk. In the meantime, through mesne conveyances, the plaintiff had acquired title
to the machine. None of the transferees had ever attempted to take possession of the
donkey, nor had any of their bills of sale been recorded. On trial of the case, the
defendant pleaded the statute of limitations and also defended on the ground that the
machine had been abandoned. Judgment was for the defendant and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court had some difficulty with the case. In addition
to the majority opinion, there were three opinions concurring in the result and one
dissent. The majority chose to decide the case on the statute of limitations argument,
making no holding on the issue of abandonment. It was held that the statute began to
run when plaintiff first became entitled to sue; that he became entitled to sue when
the donkey came to rest on defendant's property; that adverse possession in the de-
fendant was not necessary; and that no demand was necessary, since this would give
the plaintiff the power to toll the statute by simply refraining from making a demand.
Personal Property-Necessity of Demand Prior to Replevin Action. In Friendly
Finance Corp. v. Koster, 145 Wash. Dec. 348, 274 P2d 586 (1954), the assignee of
the vendor's interest in an automobile sold on a conditional sales contract brought a
replevin action against the assignee of the vendee's interest. The defendant in this
replevin action admitted plaintiff's right to the car, but defended on the ground that
plaintiff had made no demand before instituting suit. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed. The court held that since the plaintiff's right to the car was admitted, that
issue in this case was a moot question. The effect of a reversal, said the court, would
simply require the plaintiff to make a demand and bring another action, against which
the defendant admits he has no defense.
SALES
Avoidance of Disclaimer by Action For Fraudulent Misrepresentation. In Aiyquist v.
Foster, 44 Wn2d 442, 268 P.2d 442 (1954), the plaintiff brought an action based upon
fraudulent misrepresentations of the vendor of a trailer. Allegedly the vendor stated
that the sides of the trailer would not warp when exposed to moisture. When the
trailer sides did warp, and the vendor refused the return of the trailer, the vendee sued
to rescind. The action was for misrepresentation due to the inclusion in the sale con-
tract of a disclaimer clause which prevented any type of warranty action. The case
turned upon the question of whether the statements made by the vendor were state-
ments of existing facts, or mere matters of opinion. In holding for the vendee, the
court announced the general rule that a statement concerning a quality which existed
in the chattel at the time that the statement was made is a statement of an existing fact
unless the statement relates to the ability of the chattel to serve a particular use of the
vendee, or unless the satisfaction of the thing represented depends upon the performance
of a future act or the occurance of a future event. See Comment, Avoidance of Dis-
claimer by Action for Fraudulent Misrepresentation, 30 W&sn. L. Rxv. 54 (1955).
TAXATION
Employment Security Act-Applicability to Home Freezer Salesmen. In McIntyre
v. Bates, 145 Wash. Dec. 41, 272 P.2d 618 (1954), the Court held that persons engaged
in direct selling of home freezers under a so-called "food plan" fall within the scope of
the Washington Employment Security Act. The Court found the taxpayer to be an
"employer" within the meaning of RCW 50.04.080 and determined that the salesmen
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were "in employment" as required by RCW 50.04.100. In concluding that the taxpayer'
could not claim exception under the provisions of RCW 50.04.140, the Court noted
that the only freezers sold by the salesmen were those of the taxpayer and stressed
the fact that, although the taxpayer did not in fact exercise extensive control over the
actions of the salesmen, he did possess the right to, control their activities.
TORTS
Malpractice - Limitation of Action in Malpractice Suits. The
recent case of Lindquist v. Mullen' presented the problem of when the
cause of action accrues in malpractice actions predicated upon negli-
gence. The defendant left a surgical sponge in a hernia incision in
February, 1946, but continued to treat the plaintiff till October, 1949.
It was not until March, 1953, that the plaintiff discovered her suffering
was caused by the presence of the surgical sponge. The charges were
negligence in performance .of the operation, and in the diagnosis and
treatment subsequent to the injury. The court held that the action
was barred by the- three-year statute of limitation.2
Although seemingly unjust, this decision is in accord with the
general rule that the mere fact the plaintiff is not aware of her cause
of action for malpractice does not suspend the running of the statute
of limitation.' The cause of actioi for malpractice accrues at the time
of the physician's wrongful act or omission and not from the time the
patient first discovers it.
However, an exception to this general rule has been recognized in
most jurisdictions. This exception is based on the theory that where
a party is guilty of fraudulent concealment so as to prevent the injured
party from obtaining knowledge thereof, the statute of limitation does
not start to run until the cause of action is discovered or-might have
been discovered through reasonable diligence. Among these jurisdic-
tions, however, there is considerable confusion as to what constitutes
fraudulent concealment. Some take the view that an affirmative act
of concealment on the part of the physician is necessary,' while others
recognize mere knowledge and failure to disclose to the patient the
fact of injury as fraudulent.5 Still another view employs the rationale
1145 Wash. Dec. 629, 277 P2d 724 (1954).
2 RCW 4.16.080 (2).
8 74 A.L.R. 1318 (1931) ; 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943).
4 Carrol v. Peyton, 138 S.W2d 878 (Civ. App. Tex. 1940) ; Brown v. Grinstead,
212 Mo. App. 533, 252 S.W. 973 (1923).5 Picket v. Arlinsky (C.C.A. 4th), 110 F2d 628 (1940) ; Bervath v. LeFever 325
Pa. 43, 189 A. 542 (1937).
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